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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES & ESSAYS

FOREWORD: THE STATE OF THE REPUBLICAN FORM
OF GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA
Anthony Johnstone*

INTRODUCTION
This Symposium Volume,1 and the 2012 Browning Symposium it
records, explores how the states might renew their distinctive forms of republicanism within constraints, new and old, imposed by the federal government in general and the Supreme Court in particular.2 It takes its title
from the Guarantee Clause, by which the United States “guarantee[s] to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”3 More than
any other phrase in the Constitution, these words set out the basic role of
the federal government in safeguarding the processes of representative democracy in the states.
* Assistant Professor, The University of Montana School of Law. The author served as counsel
for the State of Montana in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock. Thanks to Mackenzie
Bloom and Hannah Tokerud for organizing an excellent symposium on a critical issue, to Richard
Hasen, William Marshall, and Richard Pildes for insightful comments and encouragement, to Joshua
vanSwearingen for research assistance, to Amy McNulty, Mac Morris, and Professor Larry Howell for
helpful editing, and to my family for their support. I dedicate this Foreword to William Harber, a
proponent of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1912, and my great-great grandfather.
1. Symposium, Election Law: The State of the Republican Form of Government in the States, 74
Mont. L. Rev. (2013) (through election law-related articles, essays, comments, and notes, portions of
both the winter and summer issues of the volume record the Hon. James R. Browning Symposium held
at The University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont., on Sept. 27–28, 2012).
2. For the purposes of this foreword, “republicanism” means nothing more, and nothing less, than
“a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place,” consistent with any reasonable
reading of the balance of the Constitution. James Madison, The Federalist 10, in The Federalist 129
133 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press 1961).
3. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
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Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court famously disclaimed the Guarantee
Clause as a basis for federal regulation of state politics in Baker v. Carr.4
Ever since, a student of constitutional law might fairly think the Clause to
be irrelevant, and outside academic commentary its text is rarely cited. Its
principle, however, remains active in constitutional doctrine. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, Baker presented “a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label,”5 the Equal Protection Clause.6 Through that
masquerade the federal courts entered the “political thicket.”7 Under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the rest of the federal government
soon followed the Court into the thicket with the Voting Rights Act of
1965.8 These events, and the federal campaign finance reforms of the early
1970s,9 gave rise to the modern field of election law.10
The key insight of election law is that questions about the republican
form of government pervade constitutional law. At least, the student of
election law would point out to the student of constitutional law, the Constitution itself has refined the republican guarantee by extending the “public”
of the republic to include all races,11 women,12 the poor,13 young adults,14
and the people directly in choosing senators.15 Congress implemented the
guarantee through legislation enforcing these amendments, thereby enabling the President to further shape the guarantee in the states.16 More than
this, a student of election law finds the Supreme Court engaging in a bit of
misdirection when it disclaims any interpretation or implementation of “a
Republican Form of Government.” To the contrary, the Court has imported
particular understandings of republicanism into its interpretation of the First
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that legislative apportionment presents a
justiciable issue under the Equal Protection Clause).
5. Id. at 298 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
7. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (holding that
legislative apportionment presents a nonjusticiable political question).
8. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.
9. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.
10. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1199, 1201 (1999). But see id. at 1202 (“[I]t is not true that there was no body of election law to
speak of before the 1960s. . . . Rather, what began to happen in 1962 was that a substantial body of
election law arose that could interest contemporary law school professors.”).
11. U.S. Const. amend. XV.
12. U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
13. U.S. Const. amend. XXIV.
14. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
15. U.S. Const. amend. XVII; see also U.S. Const. amend. XXIII (“The District constituting the
seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A
number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State.”).
16. See e.g. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.
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and Fourteenth Amendments, and of our federalism. Notwithstanding “the
lack of criteria by which a court could determine which form of government
was republican,”17 the Court’s varied conceptions of the republican guarantee continues to masquerade under the various constitutional sources of
election law doctrine.
As debates over the meaning of republicanism migrate into the doctrine developed under other federal constitutional provisions, the Guarantee
Clause itself, and with it any conception of a distinction between the states
and the union in the constitutional regulation of politics, fades from view.
Whatever remains of a distinct constitutional sphere of state republicanism,
and the distinct practical operation of state politics, is increasingly subsumed into high-profile federal controversies involving the Federal Election
Commission,18 Senator McConnell and the McCain-Feingold Law,19 and
the competing presidential electors for George W. Bush and Albert Gore,
Jr.20 This trend culminated last year in American Tradition Partnership,
Inc. v. Bullock,21 when the Court summarily reversed the Montana Supreme
Court’s holding that distinct state interests supporting Montana’s Corrupt
Practices Act of 1912 satisfied the free speech scrutiny required by Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.22 Thus, a Court that 50 years ago
at least wrestled with the meaning of state republicanism under the Guarantee Clause in Baker now holds, “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that the
United States Congress that enacted the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and the people of Montana who initiated and approved
the state Corrupt Practices Act of 1912, are identically situated for constitutional purposes.23
The consequences, intended and unintended, of these latest cases are
no less dramatic than those of the earliest reapportionment cases. This Volume marks an opportunity to reassess the impact of these recent federal
interventions on the republican form of government in the states. As the
varied contributions demonstrate, it also marks an opportunity to reassert a
17. Baker, 369 U.S. at 222.
18. See e.g. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); but see id. at 952
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court enlists the Framers in its defense without seriously grappling with
their understandings of corporations or the free speech right, or with the republican principles that underlay those understandings.”).
19. McConnell v. Fed. Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003).
20. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000); but see id. at 141 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the
Guarantee Clause as a defense to the Court’s “disrupt[ing] a State’s republican regime,” including a
judiciary that would construe the legislature’s enactments); see also id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing Article II, § 1, cl. 2 “imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s
government” beyond “the requirement that the government be republican in character”).
21. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
22. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900.
23. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
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role for the states in reforming republicanism in the wake of Citizens United
and related developments. Lawrence Lessig’s Keynote Address: On What
Being a (small r) Republican Means24 sets the stage. It recalls Montana’s
victory over corporate political corruption in the enactment of the Corrupt
Practices Act 100 years ago, and it asks “What should we have learned from
1912, and what have we forgotten?”25 One answer Professor Lessig offers
is the revolutionary but dormant constitutional power of states to call an
Article V convention for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, or at least threaten to do so in order to force Congress’s hand.26
States also can exert more indirect leverage on national politics. Edward Foley’s The Separation of Electoral Powers27 suggests a radically
new approach to political reform that is rooted in the principle of separation
of powers.28 Such an innovation as he proposes is practicable, if at all, only
in flexible state constitutional systems. By entrenching nonpartisan administration of all elections, state and federal, it promises a traditional republican cure for the national partisan disease. Beyond election administration,
states also hold most of the levers of basic corporate law. Ciara TorresSpelliscy’s Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously29 explores how states might help
improve what the Court in Citizens United optimistically referred to as “the
procedures of corporate democracy” for corporate campaign spending.30
While the federal Securities and Exchange Commission and Congress debate the rights of shareholders to disclosure of, or consent to, corporate
campaign spending, states are taking the lead in giving shareholders the
same opt-in rights the Supreme Court recently suggested for union members.31 Richard Hasen reconceives another political policy experiment in
the states’ laboratories of democracy, asking whether there is A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?.32 After the Supreme
Court’s fractured decision in United States v. Alvarez,33 Professor Hasen’s
typology of false campaign speech regulations shows how the diversity of
24. Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address: On What Being a (small r) Republican Means, 74 Mont. L.
Rev. 37 (2013) (Symposium, The University of Montana School of Law, Sept. 27–28, 2012).
25. Id. at 38.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 139 (2013) (Symposium Panelist).
28. Id. at 146.
29. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean for
Post-Citizens United Shareholder Rights, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 101 (2013) (Symposium Panelist).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 Mont. L.
Rev. 53 (2013) (Symposium Panelist).
33. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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regulatory regimes at the state level can help courts and commentators clarify otherwise obscure constitutional lines.34
Any proposal to reform national politics must account for state politics, but state politics is not merely a means to a national political end.
Nearly all elected officials in the United States serve at the state and local
level, including judges, prosecutors, and election officials who have no federal counterparts. As William Marshall observes in The Constitutionality of
Campaign Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s Political
History and Culture Matter?,35 each state has a distinct political culture,
and “some of the differences in political culture between the states may
express very different views of democratic theory. . . . indeed, each state
appears to express its own theory of democracy.”36 Montana’s case for a
more contextual constitutional analysis of state campaign finance systems
did not succeed in defending the 1912 Corrupt Practices Act before the
United States Supreme Court, due in part to the Court’s lack of engagement
with the realities of state politics Marshall describes.37 Although Professor
Marshall worries that a flood of outside money into state campaigns means
“[t]he uniqueness of a state’s political culture and therefore the need to
preserve it, . . . may be rapidly becoming a relic of the past,”38 his defense
of a distinct state form of politics is an argument worth having at a time
when the national political culture offers less and less worth preserving.
Edwin Bender finds that at least in empirical terms, this argument is just
beginning, not ending, in his Evidencing a Republican Form of Government.39 Bender, whose National Institute on Money in State Politics continues to break new ground in “following the money,” explains how much we
can learn, and how much more there is yet to learn, from state campaign
finance data.40 Together, Marshall’s cultural analysis and Bender’s empirical analysis point to a fruitful research agenda addressing the diversity of
republican forms of government in the states.
This foreword contributes to these discussions by situating Montana’s
experience in broader themes of federal intervention in state republicanism.
It serves as an epilogue to match Jeff Wiltse’s prologue reexamining41 the
34. Hasen, supra n. 32.
35. William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Should Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 79 (2013) (Symposium
Panelist).
36. Id. at 86.
37. Id. at 81.
38. Id. at 100.
39. Edwin Bender, Evidencing a Republican Form of Government: The Influence of Campaign
Money on State-Level Elections, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 165 (2013) (Symposium Panelist).
40. Id.
41. Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete History, 73
Mont. L. Rev. 299 (2012) (Symposium Panelist).
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election in 1912 that gave birth to the Corrupt Practices Act, by examining
the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s burial of that law 100 years later.
The foreword has two parts. Part I considers the recent federal constitutional challenges that dismantled elements of the republican form of government that prevailed in Montana for the past century. The Supreme
Court’s curt decision in American Tradition Partnership represents a nationalizing approach toward state campaign finance, both because it does
not distinguish between state and federal regulation of politics, and because
it facilitates the increased influence of national political forces that can
overwhelm state campaigns.42 That trend is evident in subsequent litigation
in Lair v. Murry43 and similar cases that continued the federal judicial deregulation of Montana politics with an unusually disruptive effect on the
2012 election.44 Not until these federal challenges abated, temporarily, did
the state courts have the opportunity to consider the concrete interests of
Montanans and the voters have their say.45
Part II considers Montana’s response to the federal constitutional challenges. That response began even before the final resolution of American
Tradition Partnership with the proposal of I-166, an initiative rebuking Citizens United and proposing “a level playing field in campaign spending”
that included prohibitions on corporate campaign expenditures.46 Montana
voters enacted that initiative by the same 3-to-1 margin that supported the
Corrupt Practices Act a century before, but by the election the Supreme
Court’s decision had mooted the initiative’s policy against corporate campaign spending. What remains is the voters’ overwhelming support for the
principle of a “level playing field.” While the Supreme Court ruled out the
most direct means of ensuring equality in campaign finance by “leveling
down” corporate and other expenditures, there are several policy reforms
Montana lawmakers can consider to fulfill the principle of greater political
equality within the constraints imposed by the current federal constitutional
regime.47 These include ensuring all campaign actors play by the same
rules of accountability,48 strengthening the enforcement of those rules,49
and “leveling up” citizen participation in campaign finance.50 Although the
anti-corporate policy of I-166 is a lost legislative opportunity to implement
more practical reforms, its pro-equality democratic principle presents a new
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Part
Part
id.
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part

I.A, infra.
I.B, infra.
I.C, infra.
II.A, infra.
II.B, infra.
II.B.1, infra.
II.B.2, infra.
II.B.3, infra.
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political opportunity for the people to reclaim their role in reforming republicanism in Montana.
I. THE FEDERAL CHALLENGES: NATIONALIZING MONTANA’S
FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Montana’s political history is closely tied to the Supreme Court’s interventions in both the earlier Baker era of reapportionment and the current
Citizens United era of campaign finance deregulation. In Montana as much
as anywhere else, the reapportionment cases transformed state politics when
a three-judge district court invalidated the Montana Legislature under Reynolds v. Sims51 and ordered “[a]n appropriate reapportionment” of the Montana House and Senate.52 As Professors Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder explain, the resulting shift of political power from “rangeland counties in
south central and southeastern Montana” to “western timber and mining
counties,” and “from rural to urban counties in each of the state’s regions,”
predictably “diminished the representation of ranchers and farmers in the
legislature, increased the representation of the professions, and left traditionally conservative rural areas increasingly opposed to any change.”53
When Montana’s 1889 Statehood Constitution also went the way of the old
legislature, this shift in political power was entrenched in constitutional
text. “A new activism surfaced in Montana,” which led the reapportioned
legislature to approve a 1970 referendum on calling a constitutional convention, which in turn led to the 1972 Constitutional Convention and ratification of a new Montana Constitution.54 The narrow margin of ratification
(less than three thousand votes and only a plurality of total votes cast55)
suggests that federal constitutional intervention of reapportionment led to
the state legislature’s support of a convention and therefore was a necessary
precondition of the new Constitution.
Over the past year, a series of cases prompted directly and indirectly
by Citizens United has led to the most significant federal constitutional intervention in Montana politics since reapportionment in the 1960s. Beginning with the invalidation of the 1912 Corrupt Practices Act’s prohibition
on corporate independent expenditures,56 federal courts have since invali51. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52. Herweg v. Thirty Ninth Leg. Assem. of Mont., 246 F. Supp. 454, 458–459 (D. Mont. 1965).
53. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 8 (Greenwood 2001).
54. Id. See generally id. at 8–15. In the post-Reynolds reapportionment period between 1965 and
1974, sixteen states proposed new constitutions, and voters ratified them in seven states. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 15. See also Cashmore v. Anderson, 500 P.2d 921 (Mont. 1972).
56. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
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dated: a 1935 prohibition on partisan judicial endorsements;57 a prohibition
on private official religious or corporate commands to vote in a certain
way;58 a requirement that campaign materials report the context of any candidate’s voting record;59 a statutory cause of action for political civil libel;60
and a prohibition on corporate contributions to independent expenditure political committees.61 There remain pending on appeal challenges to the
1912 Act’s prohibition on corporate contributions to candidates62 and a
1994 initiative’s limits on contributions to individuals and political parties.63 A federal district court denied an election-eve challenge to Montana’s political committee registration requirements,64 and a state district
court sharply rejected a challenge brought by American Tradition Partnership to Montana’s political committee disclosure requirements.65
Like the voting rights cases of five decades ago, the campaign finance
cases that define this new revolution sound in First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Like the Baker era, the Citizens United era also fundamentally redefines what the republican form of government means in Montana, with both predictable and unpredictable consequences for the State’s
political system. As one could have predicted a power shift from east to
west, and from rural to urban areas within Montana following the reapportionment cases, one can now predict an even broader power shift from inside to outside Montana, and from state and local candidates’ campaigns to
national political consultants and corporate and union executives. Both the
reapportionment and the campaign finance cases dismantled long-settled republican structures, but unlike the earlier cases the current cases also risk
empowering factions, facilitating an invasion of out-of-state influences,
57. Sanders Co. Republican Central Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 748–749 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding, on appeal at preliminary injunction stage, that Mont. Code. Ann. § 13–35–231 “is unconstitutional on its face” as a violation of free speech).
58. Zastrow v. Bullock, No. CV-12-18-BLG-RFC, 2012 WL 3066362 (D. Mont. July 27, 2012)
(reciting Secretary of State’s stipulation that Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–218(2) is unconstitutional).
59. Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1122–1123 (D. Mont. May 16, 2012) (enjoining Mont.
Code Ann. § 13–35–225(a) as unconstitutionally vague).
60. Id. at 1123–1124 (enjoining Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–131 as unconstitutionally vague).
61. Id. at 1131 (enjoining Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–227(1) & (2) as applied to independent
expenditure committees).
62. Id. at 1130 (rejecting challenge to Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227 as applied to corporate contributions).
63. See Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) (staying district court’s injunction of
contribution limits issued less than five weeks before the general election, holding the state is likely to
succeed on pending appeal).
64. See Natl. Assn. for Gun Rights v. Murry, No. CV 12-95-H-DLC (D. Mont. Oct. 29, 2012).
65. See W. Tradition Partn. v. Gallik, No. BDV-2010-1120, 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 83 (Mont. 1st
Dist. Dec. 14, 2011) (denying plaintiffs summary judgment on constitutional challenge to disclosure
requirements); W. Tradition Partn. v. Murray, No. BDV-2010-1120 (Mont. 1st Dist. Dec. 10, 2012)
(granting defendants’ motion for sanctions, including dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims) (formerly W. Tradition Partn. v. Gallik).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/2

8

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON107.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

8-APR-13

8:27

Johnstone: Foreword: The State of the Republican Form of Government in Monta

2013

REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA

13

centralizing local political campaigns in far-off power corridors like Washington D.C., and bypassing rather than expanding democratic deliberation
about republican principles.66 Not only has the Guarantee Clause principle
of distinct state forms of government disappeared from the federal constitutional regulation of state politics, but that regulation’s convergence toward a
one-size-fits-all national political regime threatens the continuation of
meaningfully distinct republican forms of government in the states.
A. American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock
Exhibit A in the nationalization of the republican form of government
in the states is American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock. In 1912,
three-quarters of Montanans enacted by initiative the Corrupt Practices Act,
a law that prohibited certain business corporations from “pay[ing] or contribut[ing] in order to aid, promote or prevent the nomination or election of
any person.”67 Montanans passed the law in reaction to a well-documented
history of the “naked corporate manipulation of the very government.”68
The law reinforced developing corporate doctrine in Montana, which held
that expenditures made “for strictly political purposes” were ultra vires
when “[t]he stockholders of the company . . . were not unanimous in their
political beliefs.”69 Over the years the legislature refined the corporate expenditure prohibition to provide for expenditures of accountable contributions voluntarily solicited within the corporation and maintained in a separate, segregated fund.70 Meanwhile, the state Commissioner of Political
Practices minimized the administrative burden of establishing and maintaining such a fund with a simple two-page registration form, identical to the
paperwork now required for disclosure of corporate campaign expenditures.71
When three plaintiffs—an association that remained active in politics
and complied with the law for over a decade,72 a sole proprietorship that
mistakenly sought tax benefits through channeling its proprietor’s political
66. See Part I.C, infra.
67. 1913 Mont. Laws 604; Montana Secretary of State, Statutory Initiative and Referendum Issues
Since Adoption of Constitutional Amendment, Article V, Section I, Permitting the Referendum and Initiative, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/archives/2010s/2010/initandref2010tbl.pdf (accessed Dec. 23, 2012).
68. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, 9 (Mont. 2011), cert. granted,
judgment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012); see also Wiltse,
supra n. 41.
69. McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling, 76 P. 194, 198 (Mont. 1904), modified on other
grounds, 79 P. 248 (Mont. 1905).
70. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227(3) (2011); cf. 1979 Mont. Laws 1011, ch. 404.
71. See Admin. R. Mont. 44.10.327, 44.10.405 (statement of organization), 44.10.531(4) (independent expenditure reporting) (2012); cf. Form C-2, available at http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/
pdf/5cfp/fillC-2COMPLETE2012-6rev (accessed Dec. 23, 2012).
72. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 6–7 (describing Montana Shooting Sports Foundation).
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spending,73 and a now-dormant lead plaintiff incorporated out-of-state “to
solicit and anonymously spend the funds of other corporations, individuals
and entities to influence the outcome of Montana elections”74—challenged
the law under Citizens United, the State Supreme Court took account of
Montana’s distinct form of republicanism to uphold the law. The Court
noted how “[i]ssues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence
upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of democracy and the republican form of government.”75 On petition for certiorari,
22 states defended the states as distinct spheres of republicanism, noting
“the special problems attendant on protecting the democratic character of
state and local elections and institutions.”76
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed none of these issues in summarily
reversing the Montana Supreme Court without review of the record in a
divided opinion. “There can be no serious doubt,” the Court held, that “the
holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law.”77 The decision appears to be the first time in decades that a divided Court summarily
reversed a state court to invalidate a state law on constitutional grounds.78
It is part of a trend of increasingly common summary dispositions that Alex
Hemmer criticizes as “a form of judicial carelessness in which summary
disposition is used not simply to manage and oversee lower courts’ dockets,
but—contrary to tradition and reason—to make new law.”79 While the Citizens United majority thought the law to be settled by its examination of
federal campaign finance law, four justices dissented. They claimed “Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s
73. Id. (describing Champion Painting).
74. Id. at 7 (describing Western Tradition Partnership, Inc.).
75. Id. at 11.
76. Br. for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respt., Am. Tradition
Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 2012 WL 1853624 at **1–2 (No. 11-1179, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)).
77. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2491; see also Br. for the States of New York et al.,
supra n. 76.
78. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916 (1990) (per curiam) (holding state tax law unconstitutional under retroactive effect of prior decision); El Vocero de P.R. v. P.R., 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (per
curiam) (holding state rule of criminal procedure unconstitutional under First Amendment); cf. Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (holding state statute preempted by
Federal Arbitration Act). One commentator found the last time such a narrowly divided Court summarily reversed a state court with so little reasoning was in 1966. Steve Vladeck, Prawfsblawg, The Math
of 5-4 Summary Reversals (or, What I Don’t Get About Bullock), Comment by Samuel Feldman, http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/the-math-of-5-4-summary-reversals.html (June 27, 2012,
3:27 p.m.) (citing Riggan v. Va., 384 U.S. 152 (1966)).
79. Alex Hemmer, Courts as Managers: American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and Summary
Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 Yale L.J. Online 209, 210 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/
1/23/hemmer.html.
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decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition,”
crucial to its prior holding, “that independent expenditures do not corrupt or
appear to do so.”80 Yet the majority avoided any examination of the record
in Montana or elsewhere and missed an opportunity “to check their understanding of the law against the best arguments of the bar and the bench,” as
Hemmer argues, “that the law is less settled than a majority believes.”81
Absent that examination, Citizens United is settled law as to the states for
little more reason than because the Court said so.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to consider American Tradition Partnership was, regardless of result, a missed opportunity to clarify the basis for
the Court’s turn in Citizens United. To paraphrase the dissent in Citizens
United, the real issue in American Tradition Partnership concerned “how,
not if”82 Citizens United applies to state law. It was, after all, the Federal
Election Commission, not the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, that “adopted 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations
and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions since
1975.”83 It was federal law, not a Montana initiative, that “force[d] speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing
research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”84 It was the federal Supreme Court, and then only
a bare majority of it, whose understanding of the republican form of government prevailed over that of a supermajority of Montanans. Even if the
law violated citizens’ political rights, or otherwise reflected an obsolete or
incomplete conception of republicanism, neither the Court nor the plaintiffs
could explain why Montanans themselves—surely with the active engagement of well-funded outside interests like American Tradition Partnership’s
financiers—could not remedy the law’s defects through ordinary state politics.
B. Lair v. Murry
A volley of challenges that followed American Tradition Partnership
illustrates how that case’s sweeping style has influenced lower courts at
least as much as its minimal substance. The most significant of these cases
is Lair v. Murry, a wide-ranging challenge to five different state campaignfinance statutes brought by American Tradition Partnership, registered and
party political committees, businesses, campaign donors, and candidates.85
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2491–2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Hemmer, supra n. 79, at 224.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 895 (majority).
Id. at 889.
Lair v. Murry, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4815411 (D. Mont. Oct. 10, 2012).
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The challenged laws include a requirement that campaign materials report
the context of any candidate’s voting record,86 a statutory cause of action
for political civil libel,87 a prohibition on corporate contributions to independent expenditure political committees,88 the 1912 Corrupt Practices
Act’s prohibition on corporate contributions to candidates,89 and limits on
contributions to individuals and political parties.90 The constitutional merits of many of the underlying claims are close, at least under the current
constitutional regime, and reasonable judges may differ as those claims
work their way through appeal. The manner in which the case was brought
and resolved, however, exemplifies how the broad nationalizing approach
of American Tradition Partnership can disrupt a state’s realization of its
own republican form of government.
The laws at issue in Lair, like many of the laws at issue in the postCitizens United challenges to state laws, sat on the books for decades without challenge. What seems to have prompted most of these claims is not a
direct relationship to specific claims vindicated in American Tradition Partnership but rather the Court’s deregulatory approach to campaign-finance
law in general. The plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement facial challenge to
a wide array of laws that provided neither a record of the laws’ actual effects in operation nor any opportunity for state executive or judicial officials to construe the laws in ways consistent with both constitutional doctrine and Montana’s republican principles. In considering vagueness challenges, the Court declined to reach such narrowing constructions, and
instead it rejected the State’s suggested readings even when it might have
saved some or all of the statutes at issue.91
Beyond this, despite the plaintiffs’ argument that part of at least one of
the statutes at issue could be severed, the Court applied a strict nonseverability standard derived from unrelated federal case law that appears to conflict with the more forgiving state standard that would reasonably apply to
an inquiry into the Montana legislature’s intent.92 Under Montana law,
86. Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (May 16, 2012) (enjoining Mont. Code Ann.
§ 13–35–225(3)(a) as unconstitutionally vague).
87. Id. at 1065 (enjoining Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–131 as unconstitutionally vague).
88. Id. at 1068 (enjoining Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–227(1), (2) as applied to independent expenditure committees).
89. Id. at 1070 (rejecting challenge to Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227 as applied to corporate contributions).
90. See Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d at 1203 (staying district court’s injunction of contribution limits
issued less than five weeks before the general election, holding the state is likely to succeed on pending
appeal).
91. Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1063–1065 (May 16, 2012) (enjoining Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 13–35–225(3)(a) & 13–37–131 as unconstitutionally vague).
92. See Lair v. Murry, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4815411 (Oct. 10, 2012) (citing Randall v.
Sorrell, 538 U.S. 230, 262 (2006)); see also Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (May 16, 2012)
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“[i]f, when an unconstitutional portion of an act is eliminated, the remainder
is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the
apparent legislative intent, it must be sustained.”93 In the absence of a severability clause, Montana law requires a court to “determine whether the
unconstitutional provisions are necessary for the integrity of the law or were
an inducement for its enactment.”94 For example, the court struck down an
uncontroversial requirement that election materials simply cite the particular votes they discuss along with an arguably vaguer requirement to disclose
“contrasting votes . . . if closely related in time.”95 Instead of looking to
Montana law of severability to resolve a question about the Montana legislature’s intent in enacting the Montana law, the Lair court repeatedly relied
on the Supreme Court’s severability standard in Randall v. Sorrell,96 a case
involving the severability of Vermont’s campaign contribution limits under
Vermont severability law. In effect the Lair court answered a question
about the Montana legislature’s intent behind the Montana law with what
three U.S. Supreme Court justices thought was the Vermont legislature’s
intent in enacting a different Vermont law.97
The court’s most sweeping and disruptive ruling invalidated all statewide campaign-contribution limits, originally enacted by initiative. It did
so in a case whose only plaintiff candidate did not finish two out of three
legislative races for which he had filed, on a record concerning exclusively
legislative and other districted offices, without analysis of Montana’s severability standard98 in the middle of ongoing statewide political campaigns,
just one month before the general election.99 The court also rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s constitutional validation of the same law nine years
before,100 instead holding that the narrow plurality opinion of Randall
(citing Randall, 538 U.S. at 262); Bd. of Nat. Resources of Wash. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir.
1993).
93. Mont. Auto. Assn. v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 311 (Mont. 1981).
94. Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 65 P.3d 576, 581 (Mont. 2003).
95. Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1062–1064 (May 16, 2012) (citing Mont. Code Ann.
§ 13–35–225(3)(a)) The vote reporting act did not contain a severability clause. See 2003 Mont. Laws
1568–1569, ch. 419. The State had conceded the provision’s nonseverability.
96. Randall, 538 U.S. 230.
97. See Lair v. Murry, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4815411 (Oct. 10, 2012) (citing Randall, 538
U.S. at 262 (citing Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1, § 215 (2003))).
98. The contribution limit act, originally enacted by initiative, did contain a severability clause. See
Const. Initiative No. 118, § 4, 1995 Mont. Laws 3717.
99. See Lair v. Murry, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4815411 (Oct. 10, 2012).
100. See Mont. Right to Life Assn. v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 812 (2004) (“The voters of Montana are entitled to considerable deference when it comes to
campaign finance reform initiatives designed to preserve the integrity of their electoral process. . . . We
hold that Montana’s interest in purging corruption and the appearance of corruption from its electoral
system is sufficiently important to withstand constitutional scrutiny, and that M.C.A. §§ 13-37-216 and 218 are closely tailored to achieving those ends. We therefore affirm the district court and hold that
these statutes are constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment.”).
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“paints a new gloss on the law.”101 Although the court did not cite Citizens
United or American Tradition Partnership, those cases painted an even
newer gloss on the court’s approach to the case: broad nationalizing strokes
obscuring the State’s underlying political process and substance. As the
court explained, its decision was not about what is “good policy and good
for Montana voters,” but “about following the law that the U.S. Supreme
Court set out.”102 Indeed, that a court’s approach to the republican form of
government in Montana should be so disengaged from what Montana voters
themselves decided is good for them shows just how deeply the courts’
constitutional doctrine has obscured the Constitution’s underlying republican principles.
C. State Court Responses
The response to Lair shows one way to reclaim those obscured republican principles by putting state republicanism into practice in Montana’s
own voice through its elected judiciary. Less than a week after the federal
district court issued its opinion and order, the Ninth Circuit stayed the order
pending appeal and concluded “the state is likely to succeed in its appeal.”103 The appellate court’s recognition that states possess distinct political systems, reflected in its concern about the irreversible “disruption in
equilibrium” that federal intervention in the election may cause,104 stands in
contrast to the district court’s disregard of state political culture and process. “The people comprising the State of Montana have a deep interest in
fair elections,” the appeals court held,105 and thus promoted the State’s
deeply rooted practice of the republican form of government over a small
faction’s late and abstract claims of liberty.
Between the district court’s order and the Ninth Circuit’s stay, a national political action committee used a state political party as a conduit for
a $500,000 contribution to a gubernatorial candidate,106 more than twenty
times the party contribution limit and nearly half of the candidate’s total
fundraising to that date.107 The opposing candidate brought a campaign
practices complaint and, in the interim, sued alleging that the reinstated
contribution limits required the return of the excess contribution. The defense tried and failed to make a federal case of it, first by removal to federal
101. See Lair v. Murry, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4815411 (Oct. 10, 2012).
102. Id.
103. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d at 1202 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 1215.
105. Id.
106. State Bureau, Republican Governors Association source of Hill’s $500k donation, Missoulian
(Oct. 25, 2012).
107. Bullock v. Hill, No. CDV-2012-904 (Mont. 1st Dist. Oct. 31, 2012).
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court,108 then by intervention and contempt motions before the district court
in Lair,109 and finally by intervention in the Ninth Circuit.110 All of the
federal courts left the case with the state court.
The state court found after a hearing that “such a [large] contribution
would likely affect the outcome of the election.”111 Under some views of
the First Amendment, that finding would be fatal to a claim to enforce a
contribution limit, since it does not sound in any theory of corruption or
other sufficient interest recognized by the Supreme Court. To the contrary,
it suggests that the law disrupts some baseline level of liberty by depriving
voters of the maximum possible amount of campaign speech. Indeed, the
court understood that most of the contribution at issue had already been
spent for pending television ads and found that such ads were “the most
effective . . . medium for political advertising.”112 But knowing this, the
state court enjoined what it called “[t]he sudden and extraordinary influx of
campaign cash” that “throw[s] a previously stable system into chaos.”113
This conclusion suggests a conception of citizens as having an interest in
implementing their own republican form of government, and seeing it enforced faithfully, that is paramount to their interest as voters in receiving the
maximum amount of core political speech. It recognizes, as Daniel Tokaji
has put it, “that election laws protect collective as well as individual interests.”114
The post-Lair litigation is a small window, opened by the prudent hesitation of federal courts to intervene in a state law matter, into how states
might guarantee for themselves their republican forms of government with
due consideration of constitutional implications. It is not the only window.
Another state court rejected American Tradition Partnership’s facial challenge to political committee disclosure requirements115 and further ordered
the release of the group’s bank records reflecting its donors on state constitutional grounds, holding that “[t]here is certainly a substantial relation be108. Bullock v. Hill, No. CV 12-97-H-DLC, 2012 WL 5287154 (D. Mont. Oct. 24, 2012) (“Interpretation of the statute is a matter of state law and the state court is better suited to engage in that exercise.”).
109. Lair v. Murry, No. 12-12-H-CCL (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2012) (“Mr. Hill and his campaign moved
to intervene in this case. . . . Mr. Hill and his campaign still may have a remedy in state court. . . .
Surely, the Montana Courts will protect the rights of the parties.”).
110. Lair v. Bullock, No. 12-35809 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2012) (“The fact that movants are faced with a
state court order enforcing the Montana law is not a ‘compelling showing’ ” supporting intervention.).
111. Bullock v. Hill, No. CDV-2012-904 (Mont. 1st Dist. Oct. 31, 2012) (finding 30).
112. Id. (finding 21).
113. Id. (conclusion 34) (citing Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200).
114. Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal
Election Laws, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 113, 156 (2010).
115. W. Tradition Partn. v. Gallik, No. BDV-2010-1120, 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 83 (Dec. 14,
2011).
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tween disclosure of this financial information and Montana’s stated constitutional interest in its citizens’ right to know.”116 The court eventually dismissed the constitutional challenge and entered findings supporting a civil
penalty against the group, holding that “the ‘officers’ and ‘members’ of
[Western Tradition Partnership—the group’s prior name] used the corporate
form as subterfuge to avoid compliance with State disclosure and disclaimer laws during the Montana election cycle.”117 Unfortunately, given
the lack of enforcement resources to pursue that information during the relevant election cycles,118 those disclosures came as many as four years too
late to inform voters and became public through the work of investigative
journalists rather than the State itself.119
The Montana Commissioner of Political Practices has taken that same
case as an opportunity to adapt the enforcement of state disclosure laws to
evolving campaign practices. Where lack of an enforcement history proved
a disadvantage in defending some campaign regulations that had not been
narrowed through interpretation, the opposite is true for state disclosure
laws. In Montana and elsewhere, the challengers to disclosure laws rely on
the Supreme Court’s idiomatic narrowing of disclosure triggers in Buckley
v. Valeo120 and subsequent cases to impose a federal reading of “major
purpose” or “express advocacy” standards on state laws that have their own
distinct histories and purposes.121 Such a reading would force the dysfunctional federal disclosure regime on states that deliberately took different and
more workable approaches to campaign finance transparency.
States successfully defended these challenges by emphasizing their
laws’ independence from the Supreme Court’s accreted interpretations of
federal campaign finance law. For example, Maine established in the First
Circuit that, for purposes of a state disclosure law, “this so-called ‘major
purpose’ test, like the other narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is
[no]thing more than an artifact of the Court’s construction of a federal stat116. W. Tradition Partn. v. Murray, No. BDV-2010-1120 (Mont. 1st Dist. Nov. 1, 2012) (Order on
Motion for Protective Order); see also Mont. Const. art. II, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of the
right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”).
117. W. Tradition Partn. v. Murray, No. BDV-2010-1120 (Mont. 1st Dist. Jan. 4, 2013) (Order).
118. See generally Part II.B.2, infra.
119. See Kim Barker & Emma Schwartz, Check ‘Em Out: Donations to Dark Money Group Revealed, Propublica & Frontline (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/governmentelections-politics/big-sky-big-money/check-em-out-donations-to-dark-money-group-revealed/ (accessed
Feb. 5, 2013).
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976).
121. W. Tradition Partn. v. Gallik, No. BDV-2010-1120, 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 83 at **13–20
(Dec. 14, 2011).
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ute.”122 Washington clarified in the Ninth Circuit that, for similar purposes,
“the distinction between express and issue advocacy that was established by
the narrowly construed [federal] statutory definitions” does “not translate
into the disclosure context.”123
Combined with its practical application of state disclosure law suggested by these cases, the Montana court’s finding of corporate “subterfuge” sets the stage for more effective enforcement against 501(c)(4) organizations like American Tradition Partnership than federal agencies like the
Internal Revenue Service and Federal Election Commission have been able
to accomplish. In the Citizens United era it is the states, not the federal
government, that are leading the way in developing and enforcing rules that
better account for campaign finance as it is practiced today.
II. THE STATE’S RESPONSE: REFORMING MONTANA REPUBLICANISM
Federal and state litigation over Montana’s old campaign finance regime will burn out in time. Many of the laws that fueled litigation have
been declared invalid, or upheld and clarified. In the near term, at least, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to spark a new round of constitutional challenges
such as those that followed Citizens United.124 The last major constitutional challenge outstanding after American Tradition Partnership is the
challenge to Montana’s contribution limit levels. According to the Ninth
Circuit in its grant of a stay pending appeal, this challenge is likely to be
rejected upon merits review by that court.125 Even if the case were to reach
the Supreme Court, it could be mooted in the meantime with modest increases in the limit levels.126 The next stage in the development of Montana’s campaign finance regime moves out of the courts and into the initiative and legislative processes. There, American Tradition Partnership and
related cases have drawn a principled popular defense of Montana’s tradi122. Natl. Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635
(2012); see also Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1009–1010 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011) (Buckley “does not indicate that an entity must have that major
purpose to be deemed constitutionally a political committee.”); see generally Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 486 (7th Cir. 2012), petition for reh’g en banc denied, (7th Cir. Nov. 6,
2012).
123. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1016.
124. See U.S. v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (concerning whether the ban on campaign
contributions by corporations in the Federal Election Campaign Act violates the First Amendment), cert.
denied, No. 12-579, 2013 WL 656067 (Feb. 25, 2013); but see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Commn.,
No. 12cv1034, 2012 WL 4466482 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 2012), prob. juris. noted (No. 12-536, Feb. 19,
2013) (concerning whether the federal biennial limit on contributions to non-candidate committees is
unconstitutional).
125. See Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d at 1202 (holding the state is likely to succeed on pending appeal).
126. See Part II.B.3, infra.
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tional republican values through the initiative process, along with an opportunity for more practical policy responses in the legislature.
A. The Principled Response: I-166
Montana’s response to American Tradition Partnership and subsequent challenges began with the popular approval of ballot issue I-166, the
“Prohibition on Corporate Contributions and Expenditures in Montana
Elections Act,”127 by the same overwhelming 3-to-1 margin that enacted
the Corrupt Practices Act a century before.128 The initiative rebukes Citizens United and Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright,129 an earlier case that invalidated Montana’s popularly initiated ban on corporate
expenditures in ballot issue campaigns, for “equat[ing] the political speech
rights of corporations with those of human beings.”130 Relying on the natural experiment that existed between Montana Chamber of Commerce and
American Tradition Partnership, when corporate ballot issue campaign expenditures were unlimited and corporate candidate campaign expenditures
were prohibited, the initiative finds that “corporate independent spending
on Montana ballot issues has far exceeded spending from other sources”131
and suggests “unlimited corporate money into candidate elections would
irrevocably change the dynamic of local Montana political office races.”132
Given this, the initiative’s primary concern is “with the infusion of unlimited corporate money in support of or opposition to a targeted candidate, the
average citizen candidate in Montana would be unable to compete against
the corporate-sponsored candidate, and Montana citizens, who for over 100
years have made their modest election contributions meaningfully count,
would be effectively shut out of the process.”133
To address this problem, I-166 establishes as “policy of the state of
Montana that each elected and appointed official in Montana, whether act127. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–501 et seq.
128. Compare Montana Secretary of State, Statutory Initiative and Referendum Issues Since Adoption of Constitutional Amendment, Article V, Section I, Permitting the Referendum and Initiative, http://
sos.mt.gov/Elections/archives/2010s/2010/initandref2010tbl.pdf (accessed Dec. 23, 2012) (44,337
(76%) For, 13,645 (24%) Against) with Montana Secretary of State, 2012 Statewide General Election
Canvass, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf (accessed Feb. 3, 2013) (343,549
(75%) For, 116,554 (25%) Against).
129. Mont. Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (invalidating Initiative No. 125 (1996)); see also First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding
unconstitutional restrictions on corporate expenditures in a ballot issue campaign).
130. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–502(2).
131. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–502(4)(b); see also W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 10 (“Evidence presented in the District Court showed that in recent years in Montana, corporate independent
spending on ballot issues has far exceeded spending from other sources.”).
132. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–502(4)(d).
133. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–502(4)(e).
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ing on a state or federal level, advance the philosophy that corporations are
not human beings with constitutional rights.”134 It charges Montana’s
elected and appointed officials with prohibiting, “whenever possible,” corporate contributions and expenditures in ballot issue and candidate campaigns.135 According to the law, “the people of Montana regard the immense aggregation of wealth that is accumulated by corporations using advantages provided by the government to be corrosive and distorting when
used to advance the political interests of corporations.”136 Beyond this,
Montana officials must “promote actions that accomplish a level playing
field in election spending.”137 That “level playing field,” which “allows all
individuals, regardless of wealth, to express their views to one another and
their government,” is to be accomplished by “limits on overall campaign
expenditures and limits on large contributions to or expenditures for the
benefit of any campaign by any source, including corporations, individuals,
or political committees.”138 Where the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
stand in the way, I-166 requires Montana’s congressional delegation to propose and “work diligently to bring . . . to a vote and passage” a resolution
proposing a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United and allow Montanans to achieve “a level playing field in election spending,” and
then it requires the Montana legislature to ratify that amendment if and
when it passes Congress.139
As a policy matter, I-166 faces monumental hurdles on the way to
achieve any practical legal effect. Its central policy already is reflected in
Montana law,140 but Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership
preclude that law from restricting independent corporate campaign expenditures. Clearing a path for the policy through the constitutional amendment
process must account for the fact that even at the time of Citizens United
approximately half the states adopted the contrary policy of allowing unlimited corporate campaign expenditures.141 Fourteen of those 26 states would
need to join the remaining 24 states to meet the 38-state “three fourths”
ratification requirement of Article V.142 And before ratification, two-thirds
of each house of Congress must propose the amendment, a level of consensus that has not existed around campaign finance reform for decades, even
134. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(1).
135. Id.
136. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(2)(c).
137. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(1).
138. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–503(2)(d) to (e).
139. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–504 (“Promotion of policy by elected or appointed officials.”).
140. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227(1) (“A corporation may not make a contribution or an
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate
or a political party.”).
141. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
142. U.S. Const. art. V.
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when Congress enacted the corporate electioneering prohibition of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 at issue in Citizens United.143
These obstacles suggest why Lawrence Lessig has urged the alternative but
still unlikely approach of bypassing Congress with a 34-state call for a constitutional convention for proposing amendments,144 an avenue not suggested by I-166.
Beyond these procedural hurdles, substantive questions complicate the
policies proposed by I-166. Contrary to the initiative’s premise that “corporate personhood” is the primary evil to be remedied, the Court in Citizens
United did not rely on any equivalence between corporations and human
beings. In fact the Court acknowledged that corporations and other associations “are not ‘natural persons.’”145 Nor does the “corporate personhood”
critique in its most basic form consider how individuals exercise their constitutional rights or political participation through a variety of organizational forms, or resolve longstanding practical questions as to how and why
to draw the line at what kind of corporations.146 Indeed, current campaign
finance law depends on corporate personhood as the object of political committee registration and disclosure requirements.147 Does I-166 concern media corporations, nonprofit advocacy corporations or corporations with only
a few shareholders and intend to exempt unincorporated business associations like partnerships? It does not say. The original Corrupt Practices Act
of 1912 was more discerning in its concern for corporations and interests
“carrying on the business” of industries such as banking, insurance, railroad, public utilities, “or any company having the right to take or condemn
land.”148 Yet, as the Montana Supreme Court conceded, that more targeted
law did not hinder “corporate domination” by the Anaconda Company’s
“controlling ownership of all but one of Montana’s major newspapers until
1959.”149 There may be a larger debate to be had here about the role of
monopolies and mass media in politics,150 but I-166 does not engage it.
143. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (H.R.
2356, 107th Cong.; House Roll Call Vote No. 34, passed 240-to-189 in the House; Senate Record Vote
No. 54, passed 60-to-40 in the Senate).
144. Lessig, supra n. 24, at 50.
145. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
146. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–1–101(22) (“ ‘Political committee’ means a combination of two or
more individuals or a person other than an individual who makes a contribution or expenditure.”); Mont.
Code Ann. § 13–1–101(20) (“ ‘Person’ means an individual, corporation, association, firm, partnership,
cooperative, committee, club, union, or other organization or group of individuals or a candidate.”)
(emphasis added).
148. Initiative Act, § 25, 1913 Mont. Laws 604.
149. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 9.
150. See e.g. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Most of the Founders’
resentment towards corporations was directed at the state-granted monopoly privileges that individually
chartered corporations enjoyed.”).
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Nor does I-166 elaborate its underlying theory of corruption. Lawrence Lessig, not a proponent of corporate money in politics, reframes the
underlying issue beyond “[w]hether or not corporations are people.”151 Instead, he recognizes Citizen United’s film “is political speech, and in our
tradition, political speech is restricted if and only if there is corruption.”152
I-166 also addresses “well-financed corruption involving corporate money,”
but it is unclear about what kind of corruption it should be understood to
mean. By its own terms, Citizens United requires campaign finance laws to
be narrowly tailored only to quid pro quo corruption, “dollars for political
favors.”153 But Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership involved the right to make independent expenditures, often candidate attack
ads, that do not meet this simple definition. Professor Lessig proposes a
broader definition of corruption as candidates’ dependence on their campaign funders rather than the people, what he calls “dependence corruption.”154 Perhaps this is closer to what I-166 means by corruption. It argues that campaign spending is “corrosive and distorting when used to advance the political interests of corporations,”155 although this conception
singles out corporate special interests to the exclusion of other potentially
corrupting special interests and reprises the problems with what I-166
means by “corporations.”
In addition to raising the question of corporate personhood and participation in campaign spending, I-166 proposes a broader policy prescription:
“limits on overall campaign expenditures and limits on large contributions
to or expenditures for the benefit of any campaign by any source, including
corporations, individuals, or political committees.”156 This enlarges the
scope of the initiative beyond corporations by themselves and suggests that
its basic concern is not solely corporate political corruption but political
equality. Notably, it is consistent with the broader principles argued by
supporters of the Corrupt Practices Act, who similarly argued “it would
level the playing field by affording ‘all candidates for nomination or election equal means of presenting before the voter their views upon public
questions.’”157 This idea, “a level playing field . . . that allows all individuals, regardless of wealth, to express their views to one another and their
151. Lessig, supra n. 24, at 44.
152. Id.
153. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910, (quoting Fed. Election Commn. v. Natl. Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)).
154. Lessig, supra n. 24, at 45; see also Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 413, 449–453 (2012) (equating corruption to factionalism).
155. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(2)(c).
156. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(2)(e).
157. Wiltse, supra n. 41, at 325 (quoting Senator Bourne Praises People’s Power League, Western
News 4 (Oct. 17, 1911)).
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government,”158 is a core constitutional principle that motivates the First
Amendment’s speech, press, petition, and assembly clauses. But long
before Citizens United, the Supreme Court deemed it irrelevant to any
proper justification of restrictions on campaign spending, corporate or otherwise.159 That does not mean the end of political quality is unattainable,
but again it does rule out the means I-166 proposes.
Given the current constitutional regime, unless and until a broader
movement leads to an improbable constitutional amendment, I-166 provides
little direct policy guidance for public officials. This is regrettable.160 Political symbolism has its place in direct democracy, but it has not been the
mode of the most successful political reform movements in Montana. To
the contrary, landmark initiatives like the 1912 Corrupt Practices Act,161 the
1980 Lobbyist Disclosure law,162 and the 1994 revision of campaign contribution limits163 contained detailed policy programs and realistic means to
put them into effect. While it is possible the support for I-166 came easily
because voters understood it to be merely symbolic, the past record of support for campaign finance reform initiatives and the strong public reaction
against Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership suggests the
2012 election may have been a lost opportunity to strengthen Montana’s
campaign finance laws.
B. The Practical Response: Legislative Reform
If the principle of political equality that motivated Montanans to enact
I-166 is to go into practice, it will have to be through different policies than
the initiative itself suggests. Absent a constitutional amendment abrogating
not just Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership but also Buckley, the policy of I-166 that “there should be a level playing field in campaign spending that allows all individuals, regardless of wealth, to express
their views to one another and their government”164 cannot be accom158. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503.
159. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an
interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’ ” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48)).
160. It also is arguably unconstitutional, ironically, according to a case won by the campaign finance
reform group Common Cause. See State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1984)
(“The initiative power within the Montana Constitution does not include the power to enact a legislative
resolution, particularly a resolution making an Article V application for a federal constitutional convention.”). See also Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock, 285 P.3d 435, 442 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]haritably speaking,” I-166 is an improper legislative resolution, “a feel-good expression
of contempt directed against the federal government and federal constitutional law.”).
161. Initiative Act, 1913 Mont. Laws 593.
162. Initiative No. 85, 1981 Mont. Laws 1643.
163. Const. Initiative No. 118, 1995 Mont. Laws 3715.
164. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(2)(d).
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plished through “limits on overall campaign expenditures” or limits on corporate and individual campaign expenditures.165 There are other policy possibilities, however, and the moment for reform has not gone unnoticed in
the Montana legislature. So far, dozens of bills have been proposed concerning campaign finance and related subjects, more than twice as many as
were proposed four years ago.166 As this is written, it is too early in the
legislative session to tell which proposals, if any, will become law.
There are other principles involved in campaign finance besides those
of I-166, of course, and at some point Montana voters may stand up for
them. But, taking the political equality principles of I-166 as a guide, Montana’s recent experience suggests several practical reforms that could help
realize a more “level playing field in campaign spending” within the constraints of the current constitutional regime. It is clear the law cannot
achieve a level playing field through a policy of leveling down corporate
and other large expenditures through prohibitions and limits. It can, however, hold those who make such large expenditures accountable and provide
sufficient resources to ensure that those laws are enforced. It can also level
up citizen participation in campaign finance to help citizen funding displace
non-citizen corporate and other funding. In Professor Lessig’s terms, the
laws can encourage campaign finance to be more dependent on the people
and less dependent on interest group money. In short, if the point of the I166 “level playing field” is to improve the game of republicanism as it’s
played in Montana, it can be accomplished by making everyone play by the
same rules (accountability), giving the referee some help (enforcement),
and getting more players on the field (participation).
1. Accountability
Montana’s campaign finance laws are relatively simple, stable, and
(until recently) rarely adjudicated. Basic definitions of campaign actors and
campaign actions are broad and straightforward. A “political committee” is
any organization that supports or opposes a candidate or ballot issue
through a “contribution” or “expenditure,” which are payments “to influence an election,” subject to exemptions for volunteers, general media, and
membership communications.167 Presumptively, political committees must
register and periodically report all expenditures and all contributions over
$35.168 Standing alone, this definition covers any conceivable campaign
165. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–503(2)(e).
166. See Montana Legislature, Legislative Bills Search, http://leg.mt.gov/css/Bills/default.asp; select
2013 Regular Session, Select a Subject Elections (accessed Feb. 3, 2013); see id.; select 2009 Regular
Session.
167. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–1–101(7), (11), (22).
168. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–229.
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funding source and subjects it to registration and disclosure. But it sweeps
too broadly to be effective for compliance or enforcement purposes, and at
the margins it raises constitutional issues. It is overinclusive of small political players, including low-dollar contributions by individuals and low-dollar expenditures by relatively small grassroots organizations.169
Administrative rules narrow the scope of covered campaign organizations and activities. An “incidental committee” is an organization not specifically maintained or organized for the “primary purpose” of influencing
elections, as determined by a multifactor test.170 Incidental committees
need only disclose “earmarked contributions” made with the express or implied direction that it be spent on behalf of a specified candidate or issue.171
The incidental committee designation respects rights of expressive association by allowing organizations to participate incidentally in campaigns
without full disclosure of their members or contributors.172 Generally, such
full disclosure would be of little use to voters because most of those contributions, by definition, would not have been intended for campaign activity.
Yet these incidental committee rules are also underinclusive and risk
leaving unregulated big political players who can overwhelm a campaign
with anonymous money through sham “incidental committees” that claim a
primary purpose like “social welfare.”173 The “earmark” and “primary purpose” triggers for political committee reporting are easily evaded by winks
and nods, allowing large donors to use “incidental committees” as conduits
for undisclosed contributions. For example, national campaign organizations may receive contributions by Montana donors intended for campaign
expenditures in Montana but argue there was no “earmark” and that they are
only “incidental committees” because most of their money funds campaigns
in other states, thereby concealing the contribution. Furthermore, an “independent expenditure” made without the “cooperation” of a candidate is limited to “expressly advocating the success or defeat of a candidate or ballot
issue.”174 Both definitions are manipulable to avoid contribution limits and
169. See Canyon Ferry Baptist Church of E. Helena v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1034 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding state campaign finance registration and disclosure requirements unconstitutional as applied to “de minimis in-kind expenditures”). The author served as counsel for the State in the case.
170. Admin. R. Mont. 44.10.327(c).
171. Admin. R. Mont. 44.10.519.
172. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association” and is protected against certain compelled disclosures under the freedoms of speech and
assembly.).
173. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
174. Admin. R. Mont. 44.10.323(3). It is not clear that the rule by itself limits the broader statutory
“expenditure” definition in general, but in an independent expenditure and election material attribution
case the Commissioner has interpreted the trigger to apply only to “express advocacy.” See In re the
Compl. Against W. Tradition Partn. & Coalition for Energy & the Env., http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/
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disclosure. An “independent expenditure” might also be made with the
knowledge and tacit encouragement of a candidate, or in cooperation with a
third party like an advertising firm or family member, to evade contribution
limits.175 Sham “issue ads” can attack a candidate as being sympathetic to
sex offenders or murderers and avoid disclosure by claiming the ad is “issue
advocacy” rather than “express advocacy.”
Clearer definitions, narrower than the laws but broader than the rules,
could focus campaign finance regulation on the bigger political players
while reducing the participation costs of smaller political players. Political
committee status might exclude organizations making expenditures below a
certain monetary threshold, relieving many small organizations from registration and disclosure for one-time expenditures. But political committee
status might also include all organizations spending over the monetary
threshold regardless of “primary purpose” to the extent their contributors do
not opt out of campaign participation, extending registration and disclosure
to organizations that now can serve as conduits for anonymous contributions. The definition of reportable campaign contributions and expenditures
also could exclude low dollar amounts, focusing on larger contributions
likely to inform voters of the significant interests behind a candidate and
committee and on expenditures likely to significantly influence an election.
Independent expenditures might include not only express advocacy but also
electioneering communications, broadcast, or published communications
that refer to a candidate within a certain pre-election period. Such a definition is available in the prohibition on anonymous election materials, which
requires attribution of the funding for “[a]ll communications advocating the
success or defeat of a candidate, political party, or ballot issue through any
broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, poster, handbill, bumper sticker, internet website, or other
form of general political advertising.”176 That attribution rule itself could
more effectively accomplish attribution of “the person who made or financed the expenditure for the communication” by clarifying its applicabilcontent/2recentdecisions/GraybillvWTPandCoalitionforEnergyandEnvironmentDecision (Mont.
Commr. of Political Pracs. Oct. 21, 2010) (Summary of Facts and Statement of Findings). There the
Commissioner interpreted “express advocacy” according to the Supreme Court’s definition of “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”
Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–470 (2007). While not requiring
“magic words,” the express advocacy standard may be more strict than necessary after Citizens United
approved regulation of “electioneering communications” defined primarily by timing and media rather
than content. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
175. See Admin. R. Mont. 44.10.323(3) (defining independent expenditure as “not made with the
cooperation or prior consent of or in consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate or
political committee or an agent of a candidate or political committee,” which may not rule out tacit
coordination).
176. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–225(1).
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ity to require attribution of each principal contributor, and not simply the
anodyne name of a front group.177 Harmonizing the expenditure and election materials definitions, now spread across two separate chapters of the
Elections Code, might also reduce compliance and enforcement costs.
2. Enforcement
Even the best laws are dead letters without effective enforcement. The
Commissioner of Political Practices is the primary enforcer of Montana
campaign finance laws. The Commissioner is an independent178 gubernatorial appointee179 managing a crowded docket of complaints.180 While the
Commissioner can hire attorneys to bring cases and refer cases to the
county attorney for fines equal to three times the amount involved in a
violation,181 only a handful of such cases have been reported. A district
court also may provide injunctive relief to an injured party and recently did
so in the aftermath of Lair.182 The Commissioner can issue orders of noncompliance, backed by civil or criminal action.183 Perhaps the Commissioner’s most effective enforcement power is limited to candidates. The
Commissioner can cause them to be removed from the ballot or can decertify the election.184 More drastically, a candidate adjudicated to have violated any election law “[m]ust be removed from nomination or office,”185
though there is no record of this occurring in recent memory, partly because
so few violations have been adjudicated, and perhaps out of a level of deference to the will of the voters.
As the rarity of reported cases suggests, the Commissioner’s office
lacks sufficient resources to enforce the law effectively. The first five
Commissioners requiring senate confirmation beginning in 1987 were con177. See id.; see also Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–217 (“A person may not make a contribution of the
person’s own money or of another person’s money to any other person in connection with any election
in any other name than that of the person who in truth supplies the money.”).
178. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–108 (restricting commissioner from participating in, contributing to, or attending events for a political campaign).
179. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–102 (“There is a commissioner of political practices who is
appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of the senate.”).
180. See Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, Status of Official Complaint Docket, http://
politicalpractices.mt.gov/2recentdecisions/docket.mcpx (accessed Feb. 5, 2013) (listing 43 active investigations in progress or pending as of Jan. 28, 2013, dating back to complaints filed in June, 2010);
Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, Campaign Finance and Practices Complaints, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/2recentdecisions/campaignfinance.mcpx (accessed Feb. 5, 2013) (listing 30 complaints resolved in calendar year 2012).
181. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–128.
182. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–108; Bullock v. Hill, No. CDV-2012-904 (Mont. 1st Dist. Oct.
31, 2012).
183. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–121.
184. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–37–126 and –127.
185. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–106.
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firmed by a combined vote of 239-to-6, but the last three have not been
confirmed and therefore may lack the necessary political support to marshal
enforcement resources.186 The insufficiency of enforcement resources
means the Commissioner cannot pursue the worst violators, and instead the
office must spend most of its time on ministerial tasks arising from reporting and minor complaints. A 2012 study of complaints since 2000 found
that just 19% of complaints accepted by the Commissioner were resolved
before the election and, more troublingly, that all but one of the meritorious
complaints were not resolved until after the election.187 Improved electronic filing, raised political committee registration and reporting thresholds, more useful and accurate attribution on election materials, and clearer
definitions of political activity would reduce the amount of paperwork and
compliance questions the Commissioner’s office must handle. A publicly
searchable disclosure database that includes all reported committees and
contributors, including independent expenditures, can facilitate the work of
media and watchdog groups in “following the money” to focus the public’s
attention on issues the Commissioner’s office may not identify on its
own.188
A decreased regulatory load, however, is only a partial substitute for
increased enforcement resources. If the legislature will not appropriate sufficient resources to ensure the timely and effective enforcement of the campaign finances laws it and the people have enacted, it might empower the
people to pursue violations through private action.189 One notable example
of the impact of insufficient enforcement resources is the matter of over
$1.2 million of undisclosed contributions to a series of ballot issue committees related to the organization Montanans in Action in 2006.190 After a
186. Anthony Johnstone, Montana Commissioner of Political Practices Study (2012) (compiling
public data available at http://politicalpractices.mt.gov) (on file with the author).
187. Id.
188. See Kevin McNellis, Best Practices for Independent Spending: Part Two, National Institute on
Money in State Politics (Mar. 15, 2012) (“A comprehensive, easily searchable, and downloadable
database provides the best public access to independent spending data.”), available at http://www.follow
themoney.org/press/PrintReportView.phtml?r=480 (accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
189. See e.g. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 9(2)(a) (“The decision [finding a violation of campaign
finance laws] may be enforced by the secretary of state, or, if the secretary of state does not file an
enforcement action within thirty days of the decision, in a private cause of action by the person filing the
complaint. Any private action brought under this section shall be brought within one year of the date of
the violation in state district court. The prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled
to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.”).
190. In re the Compls. Against Montanans In Action, Yes CI-97 Stop Overspending Montana, Citizens Right to Recall Montana, Yes I-154 Protect Our Homes Montana, and Trevis Butcher, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/MIADecision (Mont. Commr. of Political Pracs. June 26,
2009) (Summary of Facts & Statement of Findings). The author served as counsel for the State in
separate election litigation involving Montanans in Action and its affiliates. See Stop Over Spending
Montana v. State ex rel. McGrath, 139 P.3d 788 (Mont. 2006); Citizens Right to Recall v. State ex rel.
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drawn-out investigation, in 2009 the Commissioner concluded the committee was “coordinating fundraising and the laundering of substantial sums of
money from national organizations to finance expenditures by the ballot
issue committees,”191 a finding that would support a civil fine of $3.6 million.192 Yet the committee settled in 2010 for only $75,000, in return for
providing the Commissioner with largely meaningless disclosure of post
office boxes as the source for much of the funding, four years after the
election and campaign expenditures at issue.193 A counterfactual worth
considering is whether American Tradition Partnership would have attempted its strategy of anonymous campaign expenditures beginning in
2008,194 culminating in its successful challenge to the Corrupt Practices
Act, if the Commissioner had the resources to investigate and had penalized
Montanans in Action with a multi-million dollar fine shortly after the 2006
election.

McGrath, 142 P.3d 764 (Mont. 2006); Montanans for Justice v. State ex rel. McGrath, 146 P.3d 759
(Mont. 2006).
191. In re the Compls. Against Montanans In Action, Yes CI-97 Stop Overspending Montana, Citizens Right to Recall Montana, Yes I-154 Protect Our Homes Montana, and Trevis Butcher, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/MIASettlementAgreementandAttachment (Mont. Commr.
of Political Pracs. Nov. 12, 2010) (Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims).
192. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–128(1) (“A person who intentionally or negligently violates any
of the reporting provisions of this chapter . . . is liable in a civil action brought by the commissioner or a
county attorney . . . for an amount up to $500 or three times the amount of the unlawful contributions or
expenditures, whichever is greater.”).
193. In re the Compls. Against Montanans In Action, Yes CI-97 Stop Overspending Montana, Citizens Right to Recall Montana, Yes I-154 Protect Our Homes Montana, and Trevis Butcher, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/MIASettlementAgreementandAttachment (Mont. Commr.
of Political Pracs. Nov. 12, 2010) (Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims). The Commissioner concluded based on his investigation that “[f]ront and center in that coordination was Americans
for Limited Government and other affiliated groups financed by New York real estate developer Howard
Rich,” though the most frequent contributor was disclosed only as “America at its Best,” care of a post
office box in Kalispell, Montana. Id.
194. Under its former title Western Tradition Partnership, the organization promised its donors anonymity in its 2010 fundraising appeal:
There’s no limit to how much you can give. As you know, Montana has very strict limits on
contributions to candidates, but there is no limit to how much you can give to this program.
You can give whatever you’re comfortable with and make as big of an impact as you wish.
Finally, we’re not required to report the name or the amount of any contribution that we
receive. So, if you decide to support this program, no politician, no bureaucrat, and no radical
environmentalist will ever know you helped make this program possible. The only thing we
plan on reporting is our success to contributors like you who can see the benefits of a program
like this. You can just sit back on election night and see what a difference you’ve made.
W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 7 (quoting Western Tradition Partnership, 2010 Election Year
Program Executive Briefing (emphasis added)).
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3. Participation
After American Tradition Partnership, any attempt to “level the playing field” consistent with the principles of I-166 cannot rely on leveling
down corporate campaign spending. Instead, reform efforts according to
those principles must ensure that corporate and other special-interest campaign spenders play by the same rules of accountability that apply to everyone else. That includes clarifying campaign-finance registration and reporting laws to require accountability from all political actors that seek significant influence in elections, whether they are individuals or organizations,
and, at least for independent expenditures, whether or not those organizations are business corporations. It also includes effective enforcement. Yet
in a regime of unlimited campaign expenditures, where leveling down noncitizen campaign spending is not an option, getting to a “level playing field”
also requires leveling up citizen participation in campaign finance.195
One way to accomplish this goal of citizen-funded campaigns is by
raising the money directly from all or most Montanans through public funding or tax incentives, rather than from just some Montanans through the
current system. In 2012, Montana state candidates raised approximately
$10 million in campaign contributions (half of which was raised by candidates for governor), parties raised about $3 million, and ballot measure
committees raised less than $500,000.196 This amount does not include independent expenditures.197 In 2012, approximately 500,000 Montanans
voted,198 but only 32,576 individuals (some from outside Montana) contributed in reportable amounts to candidate campaigns.199 It would take a relatively small public investment to scale up to nearly full participation by
Montana citizens and nearly full candidate dependence on Montana citizen
contributions, or in other words, independence from non-citizen contributors. For approximately $10 per voter each year, Montana voters could
fully fund candidate campaigns in each biennial election cycle through a
“democracy voucher” or another tax credit plan similar to what Professor
195. This terminology was introduced in this context by Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, LevelUp Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & Pol. 227
(1983).
196. National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2012 Montana State Overview, http://www.follow
themoney.org/database/state_overview.phtml?s=MT&y=2012 (accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
197. Neither the National Institute on Money in State Politics nor the Commissioner of Political
Practices publishes a total of independent expenditures or information sufficient to readily calculate a
total.
198. See Montana Secretary of State, Montana Voter Turnout, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Voter_
Turnout/index.asp (accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
199. Supra n. 196.
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Lessig proposes.200 This may be a worthwhile investment in helping
Montanans choose public officials who should be spending taxpayer money
on behalf of the voters rather than big players in political campaigns.
Short of such public investments, Montana law could encourage more
citizen participation through small individual contributions by deregulating
them. For example, raising individual contribution disclosure thresholds
above the current $35 might encourage more funding from the thousands of
additional donors who contribute below the threshold.201 The informational
value of relatively small contributions is low and may deter Montanans
from giving to candidates they support in a world where campaign contributions are easily accessible online. The disclosure threshold in the original
1975 revision to the campaign finance laws was $25,202 and was raised to
$35 in 1987.203 Adjusted for inflation, the original 1975 threshold would
amount to more than $100 today.204 A moderately high threshold for political committee registration might also encourage collective participation at
the grassroots level.205 The 1912 Corrupt Practices Act required reporting
for independent expenditures exceeding $50,206 which amounts to more
than $1,000 today.207
Lastly, unless other reforms succeed in increasing participation of
small donors significantly, moderately increased individual contribution
limits might be necessary to “level the playing field” between citizen contributions and non-citizen (including corporate) independent expenditures. In
2012, the average winning house candidate raised approximately $10,000
under a $320 per-cycle contribution limit (primary and general election limits combined); the average winning statewide candidate raised approximately $100,000 under a $620 per-cycle contribution limit; and the winning
candidate for governor raised nearly $2 million under a $1,260 per-cycle
contribution limit.208 Although the constitutional case made in Lair to in200. Lessig, supra n. 24, at 43; see also Bender, supra n. 39, at 178 (discussing a matching-fund
system and arguing, “[w]ith a match on $50 donations, candidates would have an incentive to reach out
to more small-dollar donors for support, thus increasing their support base and potentially their support
at the polls”).
201. Bender, supra n. 39, at 179.
202. 1975 Mont. Laws 1254.
203. 1987 Mont. Laws 43.
204. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm
(accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
205. Cf. Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc., 556 F.3d 1021 (holding Montana’s
“in-kind” expenditure definition must have a constitutional de minimis exemption for small expenditures).
206. Initiative Act, § 12, 1913 Mont. Laws 600.
207. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm
(accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
208. National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2012 Montana State Overview: Candidates, http:/
/www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=MT&y=2012 (accessed Feb.
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validate the contribution limits on their face is relatively weak,209 there may
be a stronger policy case to raise them. The original contribution limits
enacted in 1975 would amount to more than $1,000 for legislative candidates, $3,200 for statewide candidates, and $6,400 for candidates for governor.210 These limits are substantially higher and reasonably could be
claimed to permit corruption or the appearance of corruption, particularly
for a legislative candidate who could finance a campaign with only a handful of large contributions. But it is worth considering whether there is a
middle ground that still requires a wide base of citizen funding and also
allows a candidate sufficient funds to respond to independent campaign expenditures funded by non-citizen sources.
CONCLUSION
For most of the past century, Montanans conducted their politics according to a distinct form of republicanism informed by the State’s history,
culture, and, most importantly, its people acting through the democratic
process. As Jeff Wiltse concludes, “the reforms implemented 100 years
ago—including the Corrupt Practices Act—are now woven into the fabric
of the state’s unique political culture, a culture characterized by face-to-face
campaigning, weak party loyalty, skepticism of outside interests, and grassroots activism.”211 That politics, like all politics, is imperfect. But it is at
least Montana politics, and the state government those politics sustain is
without doubt a republican form of government. In striking down the Corrupt Practices Act, American Tradition Partnership ended the era that cultivated this politics over a century. It and the cases that followed brought the
new national politics of Citizens United to the states. Through its courts
and under its Constitution, the United States guaranteed that Montana
would have a different form of government now. That government may
still be republican, but its politics certainly will be less Montanan.
No sooner had the Supreme Court buried the Corrupt Practices Act
than the People of Montana attempted to resurrect it with I-166. After
American Tradition Partnership, I-166 is a lost opportunity as a matter of
policy, yet it presents a new opportunity as a matter of principle. It reminds
the State that after a century the people of Montana still believe in the principle of political equality that motivated the Corrupt Practices Act of 1912
5, 2013); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–37–216; Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, Political Campaign Contribution Limits Summary (Oct. 2011), http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/5campaignfinance/ContributionLimitSummaryfor2012ElectionCycle (accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
209. See Part I.B, supra.
210. 1975 Mont. Laws 1265, ch. 481, § 1; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm (accessed Feb. 5, 2013).
211. Wiltse, supra n. 41, at 337.
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and directs its lawmakers that the principle be put into practice in some
way. That way cannot be the backward-looking policy of leveling down
corporate and other independent expenditures, though the law can require
those players to play by the same rules of accountability as candidates and
individuals and can ensure those rules are enforced effectively. Another
way might be a forward-looking policy of leveling up citizen participation
in campaign finance through small-donor deregulation and, perhaps, tax incentives or increased individual contribution limits. I-166 cannot be a
roadmap for campaign finance reform in Montana, but it can be a banner for
those who lead the way there.
If Montana law does not change, Montana politics will. The next election will look even more like national politics than the last. More mailboxes will fill with unseemly attack mailers, some of them traceable only to
other mailboxes. More secret donors, many from out-of-state and some incorporated, will launder big contributions of dark money through groups
with misleading names in furtherance of hidden agendas. More campaign
finance complaints will be filed that may or may not be resolved before the
election, and the violators with enough money at stake will delay compliance for years, if they comply at all. More than nine-out-of-ten voters will
not contribute to a candidate or political committee to counter the mailers,
the dark money, and the campaign finance scofflaws because it is not worth
the trouble. And, given this, candidates and elected officials will pay less
attention to citizens than they should in any republican form of government.
Despite its legal victories, however, American Tradition Partnership likely
will not be the one behind the mailers, in front of the secret donors, or on
the case captions. Its lone employee reportedly resigned after the election
to take a new job—with Congress.212

212. See Associated Press, Secretive Conservative Group Appears Ready to Vanish, Billings Gazette
(Jan. 22, 2013).
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